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ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF CHATTEL
MORTGAGES*
JOHN McDILL Fox'
W EIHERE a debt is secured, or a performance, by a chattel mortgage
the security continues throughout to be personal property and is
so largely governed by local statutes that a few elementary considera-
tions with reference to the Wisconsin doctrine and treatment of chattel
mortgages might not be out of place.
It is the doctrine in Wisconsin that the title to the mortgaged prop-
erty is in the mortgagee, i.e., the rule in chattel mortgages is the opposite
of the rule in real mortgages. But though the title is vested in the
mortgagee it is only a special title, the mortgagor having the equitable
ownership in him.
"It is elementary," says Justice Marshall in Illinois Trust and Sav-
ings v. Alexander Stewart Lumber Company,' "that a mortgagee of
chattel property holds the legal title thereto, but nevertheless, till default
and actual possession of the property in himself, his interest, as against
the mortgagor or any person claiming under him, is special. It is limited
to the amount of the mortgage indebtedness. The general property and
the equitable title being in the mortgagor or those claiming under him,
the mortgagor may sell the mortgaged property and convey a good title
thereto subject to the mortgage. Such title is equitable in character,
to be sure, but it is of sufficient dignity to be regarded as a general prop-
erty right, good as against the whole world except as to the special
interest of the mortgagee, which, till it becomes absolute, may be extin-
guished by the owner of the general property by payment of the
mortgage indebtedness. In case of a conversion of the property as to
the mortgagee, the measure of damages recoverable by him is limited
to the value of his special interest therein, the amount due- upon the
mortgage.' The mortgagor may not only sell the prdperty and convey
a good title subject to the mortgage, but he may place a second mort-
gage thereon, and the subsequent vendee or mortgagee may protect his
* Ed.-This article contains a preliminary statement of the Law of Chattel
Mortgages and will be followed in the April issue by a consideration of chattel
mortgages on stocks of goods in trade and after acquired property generally, a
comparison of chattel mortgages and conditional sales provisions and the manner
of foreclosure of each.
t Professor in the Marquette University School of Law.
119 Wis. 54, 94 N.W. 777.
'2Smith v. Konst, 5o Wis. 360, 7 N.W. 293.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
interest and clothe himself with a full legal title by paying off the first
incumbrance."3
What constitutes a chattel mortgage? Where the property is mutu-
ally intended to act as security for a loan and the title rather than merely
the possession (as in a pledge) is placed in the lender, the transaction
is in essence a mortgage as between the parties and if the statutory
requirements are observed as to others. It may be given in the ordinary
form, i.e., a deed absolute with a description of the goods usually with
a covenant of warranty followed by a proviso that if the note, debt, or
other obligation be paid then the conveyance shall be void, or it may be
in form a bill of sale. Mere inaccuracies of description of property
covered by a chattel mortgage are not fatal if the subject is so de-
scribed that it can be readily identified by the exercise of ordinary care,
or even by the aid of extrinsic evidence, where there is sufficient in the
writing to put one acting reasonably on inquiry.4 So also when there is
no provision in the mortgage itself governing possession pending ma-
turity of the debt, the mortgagee may exercise his own discretion as to
taking possession of the property.'
The Wisconsin statute provides6 : "No mortgage of personal prop-
erty shall be valid against any other person than the parties thereto un-
less the possession of the mortgaged property be delivered to and re-
tained by the mortgagee or unless the mortgage or a copy thereof be
filed as provided in section 2314,"' and so forth. Compare the language
of this section with that of 2241," the section with reference to the
recording of deeds and mortgages to real estate. This section provides
(section 224) : "Every conveyance of real estate (and under the fol-
lowing section 22429 conveyance is defined to include mortgage) within
this state hereafter made .... which shall not be recorded as provided
by law shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith
and for a valuable consideration of the same real estate or any portion
thereof whose conveyance shall first be duly recorded." As to the affi-
davit of renewal and the subsequent renewal of such affidavit, however,
the chattel mortgage statutes with reference to renewal (sections 2315" °
'Smith v. Coolbaugh, 21 Wis. 427.
4 Adler v. Godfrey, 153 Wis. 186, 14o N.W. 115.
'Appleton Iron Co. v. British Am. A. Co., 46 Wis. 23, I N.W. 9.
' Sec. 2313, Wis. Stats. (1923); Sec. 241.08, Wis. Stats. (925). All statute
sections are cited in the article as numbered in the statutes of 1923. The 1925
citations can be found in the footnotes.
'Sec. 241.10, Wis. Stats. (1925).
'Sec. 235.49, Wis. Stats. (1925).
Sec. 235.50, Wis. Stats. (1925).
"Sec. 24I.11, Wis. Stats. (1925).
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and 231611) adopt the same form as the real estate recording act, namely
make conformity therewith invalid as against subsequent purchasers or
mortgagees in good faith and creditors, while with reference to the
filing of the original mortgage or lack of change of possession, the
mortgage is invalid against all persons except the parties thereto. Com-
menting in this distinction, the late Chief Justice Winslow in First Na-
tional Bank of Edgerton v. Biederman," said:
". ... The question is whether failure to file a chattel mortgage
can only be taken advantage of by subsequent purchasers or mortgagees
in good faith, or whether persons dealing with the property with notice
can also take advantage of it. The section itself (section 2313) 13 seems
very plain and unmistakable. It says that no chattel mortgage "shall
be valid against any other person than the parties thereto" unless the
possession of the property be delivered and retained or the mortgage
duly filed. There is no room for interpretation or construction here.
The words are definite and the meaning certain--"any other person
than the parties" can mean but one thing and the court is not at liberty
to construe it to mean anything else. In the majority of the states notice
of an unrecorded mortgage will deprive a subsequent purchaser or
mortgagee of any protection under the filing act; he will take subject to
the rights of the holder of the unrecorded mortgage. In Wisconsin,
however, unrecorded mortgages have no validity as against subsequent
purchasers or mortgagees, even though they have actual notice of
them.14 This has been squarely decided by this court. 15 In Manson v.
Phcenix Insurance Company,6 language which seems to indicate a con-
trary view was used, but the question there was simply whether an un-
recorded mortgage was valid as between the parties. The question at
issue in Ulinan v. Duncan,17 was as to the construction of Section
2315's statutes with regard to the failure to file an affidavit of renewal,
and by the very terms of this latter section the only persons protected
are "subsequent purchasers or mortgagees in good faith." It seems un-
questionable that our filing statutes make sharp practice possible and
enables one who has full notice of a previously unrecorded mortgage to
purchase the property or to take a mortgage thereon to secure a pre-
existing debt or one presently created, with the deliberate purpose of
cutting off the unrecorded mortgage. The idea of the statute doubtless
is that it is better to have the statute certain and effective than it is to
leave the question in each case to depend on notice or good faith, and
Sec. 241.12, Wis. Stats. (1925).
149 Wis. 8, 139 N.W. 84.
3 Sec. 241.o8, Wis. Stats. (1925).
"Jones Chat. Mortg., 5th ed. sec. 313, 314.
'Parroski v. Goldberg, 80 Wis. 339, 50 N.W. 191; Ryan Co. v. Hvanzbsahl,
89 Wis. 61, 61 N.W. 299; Dornbrook v. Rumley Co., 120 Wis. 36, 97 N.W. 493.
1664 Wis. 26, 24 N.W. 407.
1 73 Wis. 213, 47 N.W. 266.
"Sec. 241.11, Wis. Stats. (1925).
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thus afford opportunity for conflict in oral testimony and offer a reward
to active and fertile memories.
This case also establishes the necessity of strict conformity with the
statute. In this case there was a mortgage by a partnership. The statute
provides (23141") that every mortgage be filed with the clerk of the
town, city or village where the mortgagor resides. The case held that
in order to conform, where the partners resided each at separate places,
that a copy of the mortgage be filed at each place where a partner re-
sided, otherwise there was no conformity. This seems still to be the law.
The question of change of possession once caused some little trouble.
Statute 231020 relates to the presumption of fraud if possession be not
changed. The case of Ryan Company v. Hvambsahl, supra, had held
that where a chattel mortgage was unrecorded the failure to change the
possession was fraudulent as a matter of law and the circuit court sus-
tained an attachment based upon a fraudulent conveyance which was
upheld by the supreme court. That case was, however, subsequently
overruled by St. Louis Clary Products Company v. Christopher,21 hold-
ing that section 2310 was not applicable to chattel mortgages and that
an unrecorded mortgage, where the possession was not changed was not
fraudulent, but merely invalid as against all persons except the parties
thereto and since the mortgagor does not control the filing, the mere
fact that the mortgagee fails to file it does not justify the issuing of an
attachment against the property of the mortgagor on the ground of
fraud.
"Sec. 24I.io, Wis. Stats. (1925).
' Sec. 24i.o5, Wis. Stats. (1925).
21 152 Wis. 603, i4o N.W. 351.
